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Students in complex visual domains must acquire visual problem solving strategies that allow them to
make fast decisions and come up with good solutions to real-time problems. In this study, 31 air traffic
controllers at different levels of expertise (novice, intermediate, expert) were confronted with 9 problem
situations depicted on a radar screen. Participants were asked to provide the optimal order of arrival of
all depicted aircrafts. Eye-movements, time-on-task, perceived mental effort, and task performance were
recorded. Eye-tracking data revealed that novices use inefficient means-end visual problem solving
strategies in which they primarily focus on the destination of aircraft. Higher levels of expertise yield
visual problem solving strategies characterized by more efficient retrieval of relevant information and
more efficient scan paths. Furthermore, experts’ solutions were more similar than intermediates’ solu-
tions and intermediates’ solutions were more similar than novices’ solutions. Performance measures
showed that experts and intermediates reached better solutions than novices, and that experts were
faster and invested less mental effort than intermediates and novices. These findings may help creating
eye-movement modeling examples for the teaching of visual problem solving strategies in complex
visual domains.
 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
In many complex cognitive domains, professionals (e.g., medical
specialists, power plant controllers, pilots) make decisions on the
basis of their interpretation of complex visualizations. Air traffic
controllers, for example, need to interpret available visual infor-
mation on a radar screen in order to guide aircraft to an airport.
Students in air traffic control (ATC) must develop domain-specific
visual problem solving strategies to become experts in their
domain. Process-oriented worked examples that make the cogni-
tive processes of experts visible can help students learn to solve
particular problems (Van Gog, Paas, & Van Merriënboer, 2006,
2008; Van Gog & Rummel, 2010). In visual domains, eye-
movements are a direct indicator of visual expertise because they
change as experience increases from novice towards expert (foretherlands, Valkenburgerweg
762464.
n Meeuwen).
All rights reserved.overviews, see Gegenfurtner, Lehtinen, & Säljö, 2011; Gegenfurtner,
Siewiorek, Lehtinen, & Säljö, 2013; Reingold & Sheridan, 2011;
Spivey & Dale, 2011). So-called eye-movement modeling exam-
ples (EMMEs) may make the visual problem solving process visible
by superimposing an expert’s gaze pattern on the image so that the
learner can study what an expert is looking at and in which order
(Jarodzka et al., 2012; Jarodzka, Van Gog, Dorr, Scheiter, & Gerjets,
2013; Van Gog, Jarodzka, Scheiter, Gerjets, & Paas, 2009). Howev-
er, there are open questions in terms of how to design EMMEs using
experts’ eye-movements. The first question concerns the strategies
for visual problem solving used at different levels of expertise
(Feldon, 2007; Jarodzka, Scheiter, Gerjets, & Van Gog, 2010). The
second question is whether these strategies lead to one common
solution or to a wide variety of solutions when carrying out a
perceptual task (cf. Medin et al., 2006).
With regard to strategies used at different levels of expertise, at
least three levels can be distinguished in the development towards
expert performance (Berliner, 1986; Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008;
Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). Novices are beginners in a domain
without relevant experience; they gradually build up a large
amount of knowledge which is represented in networks that result
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already acquired first experiences in a domain, which allows them
to encapsulate parts of their knowledge leading to shortcuts in
reasoning and thus higher performance. Experts’ knowledge is
stored in an entirely different, but very efficient manner, namely in
scripts (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008), enabling them to show
“consistently superior performance on a specified set of represen-
tative tasks for a domain” (Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996, p. 277). Most
research on visual problem solving focused on experts only or on
differences between novices and experts. The number of studies
using intermediates is limited (Gegenfurtner et al., 2011; Reingold
& Sheridan, 2011), and, thus, there is a lack of knowledge about
stages in the development of visual problem solving as well as the
strategies novices, intermediates and experts use when solving
visual problems. This knowledge is needed for designing example-
based learning materials such as EMMEs. Moreover, it is important
to know whether particular visual problem solving strategies lead
to different solutions for the same problem or not; obviously, it is
more desirable to teach problem solving strategies that lead to
similar and good solutions for a wide range of problems.
This article aims at gaining insight in howexpertise affects visual
problem solving strategies, similarity of found solutions, and per-
formance. The next sections discuss the visual problem solving
strategies novices, intermediates and experts usewhen carrying out
perceptual tasks; the degree to which people with different exper-
tise levels and strategies come up with either common or different
solutions for the problem at hand, and themoderating effect of task
difficulty when studying the influence of expertise on visual prob-
lem solving strategies, the similarity of solutions, and performance.
1.1. Visual problem solving strategies
When solving problems, cognitive schemas retrieved from long-
term memory enable the use of problem solving strategies
(Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008). At least three problem solving stra-
tegies can be distinguished for solving visual problems, namely,
attention focusing, chunking, and means-end analysis (Chi, Glaser,
& Rees, 1982; Gobet & Simon, 1998; Haider & Frensch, 1999; Simon,
1975).
When using the strategy attention focusing schemas help to
distinguish between relevant and irrelevant information and so
enable problem solvers to focus on what is important in a given
problem situation. Haider and Frensch (1999) describe in their in-
formation-reduction theory that experts optimize the amount of
processed information by separating task-irrelevant from task-
relevant information. This theory was supported by the findings
in a meta-analysis by Gegenfurtner et al. (2011) and by Reingold
and Sheridan’s (2011) review of research on expertise in medicine
and chess. In the field of aviation, two studies support the
information-reduction theory. Kasarskis, Stehwien, Kickox, and
Aretz (2001) studied scanning characteristics of novice and
expert aircraft pilots during landing. They found that eye-scanning
patterns and specific fixation behaviors of experts differed from
those of novices. Experts showed shorter but relatively more eye-
fixations (during fixations the eyes stand still and take in new in-
formation), more eye-fixations on relevant points such as aim point
and airspeed, and fewer fixations on less relevant points such as the
altimeter because all necessary altitude informationwas obtainable
from the true horizon. Also in a study by Bellenkes, Wickens, and
Kramer (1997), expert pilots scanned more crucial instruments
during a simulated flight task than novices. In ATC the use of in-
formation reduction could show in experts fixating faster on rele-
vant objects (i.e., aircraft) and fixating them relatively longer.
The strategy of perceptual chunking relevant information,
described as unitization by Goldstone (1998), makes it possible tocombine important elements together so that they can be treated in
working memory as one information element in a given problem
situation. This requires less effort than processing all elements
separately. For example, experts in chess are known to become
familiar with complex configurations of separate chessmen and
they are able to recognize these configurations as single units
(Jongman, 1968). Hence, experts use schemas formed from earlier
experiences and recognize familiar compositions of task elements
or ‘patterns’ (e.g., frequently occurring air traffic situations) without
viewing all the details (Gobet & Simon, 1998). In ATC, the use of
perceptual chunking would be manifest in less gaze switches (i.e.,
transitions) between separate elements (e.g., aircraft), because
particular groups of elements (e.g., all aircraft in a queue) are
perceived as one element (i.e., chunk).
The strategy that can be characterized as means-end analysis is
based on schemas for working backward from the goal, rather than
working towards the goal. This strategy is described as a highly
general but effort-demanding problem solving strategy (Simon,
1975), where the task performer uses a continuous orientation
on the goal (the ‘end’) and tentatively applies operators (the
‘means’) to determine a next step in the problem solving process
that helps to move in the direction of the goal. More advanced
problem solvers understand which routine of operations is un-
derlying the final solution. Thus, they do not reason backwards
from the goal but decide based on the prior act what the next act
should be to reach the final goal. This sequence of actions can ul-
timately become automated, leading to fast and accurate perfor-
mance which hardly requires the investment of mental effort (Chi
et al., 1982; Sweller, 2004; Van Merriënboer, Clark, & De Croock,
2002). In a visual domain like ATC, the use of means-end anal-
ysis would be manifest by frequently focusing (i.e., more eye-
fixations) on the goal (e.g., the airport), whereas working-
forward strategies would be manifest by frequently focusing on
the elements that are affected by the problem solving steps (e.g.,
the aircraft).
1.2. Similarity of solutions
For problems in complex visual domains, there is typically not
one general problem solution but a broad range of solutions that
may vary from suboptimal (or even incorrect) to more optimal
(Gronlund, Dougherty, Durso, Canning, & Mills, 2005; Mumford,
Schultz, & Van Doorn, 2001). In ATC, for example, the number of
acceptable solutions to guide the aircraft to an airport is restricted
by safety rules and the need for efficiency (safety: maintaining at
least five miles horizontal separation and 1000 feet vertical sepa-
ration; efficiency: causing as little delays as possible), but there are
many degrees of freedom in finding these solutions (e.g., you can
keep enough separation between aircraft by changing either their
speed, height or direction).
The level of expertise influences the ability of anticipating on
possible situations (Mumford et al., 2001) resulting in more or less
optimal solutions. For novices, visual problem solving is highly
demanding because they have not yet cognitive schemas available
that help them organize the perceived information. Due to their
limited working-memory capacity they are easily overwhelmed by
the amount of information, especially when this information is
transient such as in ATC (Lowe, 2003; Mayer, 2005; Scheiter,
Gerjets, Huk, Imhof, & Kammerer, 2009; Spanjers, Van Gog, & Van
Merriënboer, 2010; Sweller, Van Merriënboer, & Paas, 1998). As a
consequence, their awareness of the current situation will be
limited, incomplete and sometimes erroneous, which hampers
their projection of the future status (Endsley, 1995) and thus leads
to a broad range of dissimilar solutions, includingmany incorrect or
suboptimal solutions.
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them to organize given informationwhen they are confronted with
visual problems, but, compared to experts they have more prob-
lems with linking their schemas to specific problem situations
(Boshuizen & Schmidt, 1992, 2008). They still have difficulties with
immediate pattern recognition or may be not aware that a chosen
schema is not appropriate for the given problem and thus miss
important details for correct decision making (for an overview, see
Gegenfurtner et al., 2013). It can thus be expected that in-
termediates find better and more similar solutions than novices,
but there will still be a notable dissimilarity across solutions
because they frequently come up with less optimal solutions.
Experts possess well developed schemas for many specific sit-
uations (e.g., in ATC: “inbound traffic from the west with strong tail
wind”), which help them to quickly build a good awareness of the
problem situation (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008; Schmidt, Norman,
& Boshuizen, 1990). The number of available schemas also in-
creases experts’ repertoire for solving problems (De Groot, 1978;
Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996; Gobet & Simon, 1998), resulting in a
flexible range of potential problem solving strategies (Lesgold et al.,
1988). Their ability to quickly recognize a broad range of problem
situations allows them to come up with optimal solutions (Endsley,
2006), and because most of these solutions are optimal they can be
expected to be relatively similar. If any differences occur, these will
be marginal and based on personal preferences.
1.3. Performance and task difficulty
A better understanding of visual problem solving strategies and
similarity of solutions will help to explain differences in performance
between experts, intermediates and novices. Such performance dif-
ferences have been well documented in literature, showing that ex-
perts outperform intermediates and novices, and intermediates
outperform novices. First, higher expertise is associated with higher
accuracy and reaching more optimal solutions (Ericsson, 2006). Sec-
ond, higher expertise is associatedwith faster performance or speed,
meaning thatexpertsnotonly reachbettersolutionsbutalsodothis in
less time (Lesgold et al., 1988). Third, experts have better developed
schemas allowing them to make changes already early which means
that they prevent conflicts later in the process, resulting in lower
mental effort during task performance (Sweller et al., 1998).
Performance differences between experts, intermediates and
novicesmaynot show for all levels of task difficulty (in ATC: amount
of aircraft that must be controlled, potential conflicts, weather
conditions). For example, novices and intermediates may perform
equally well on very easy tasks, while intermediates and experts
may perform equally well on tasks at a medium level of difficulty.
Thus, it is important to compare expertise levels across tasks with
different difficulty levels, and performance differences between
experts, intermediates, and novices may become more visible as
tasks become more difficult. Furthermore, eye-movements and vi-
sual problem solving strategies may also vary as a function of task
difficulty (cf. Gegenfurtner et al., 2011). Less experienced problem
solvers are not yet able to ignore irrelevant information, chunk
related elements andwork forward, which causes conflicts with the
limited capacity of processing capacity available, especially formore
difficult tasks (Mayer, 2005; Mayer & Moreno, 2003). Therefore,
differences in visual problem solving strategies and similarities of
solutions between experts, intermediates and novices are also ex-
pected to become more visible in more difficult tasks.
1.4. Hypotheses
Experts, intermediates and novices are expected to use different
visual problem solving strategies and will thus show different eye-movements (Hypothesis 1). First, experts will have a better
information-reduction strategy resulting in more eye-fixations on
relevant areas of interest and shorter times to the first fixation on
these relevant areas of interest compared to intermediates and
novices (Hypothesis 1a). Second, experts will have a better
perceptual chunking strategy resulting in less gaze switches be-
tween single elements (e.g., they deal with groups of aircraft rather
than a single aircraft) and thus more efficient scan paths compared
to intermediates and novices (Hypothesis 1b). Third, experts will
not use means-end analysis but a working-forward strategy,
resulting in less eye-fixations on the destination point of the
aircraft compared to intermediates and novices (Hypothesis 1c).
Furthermore, experts are expected to reach more similar task
solutions than intermediates, and both experts and intermediates
are expected to reach more similar solutions than novices (Hy-
pothesis 2).
For the quality of performance, experts are expected to reach
better solutions in less time and to invest less mental effort than
intermediates, and both experts and intermediates are expected to
reach better solutions in less time and to invest less mental effort
than novices (Hypothesis 3).
Finally, the differences between experts, intermediates and
novices are expected to be more pronounced for relatively difficult
tasks than for easy tasks, yielding interactions between level of
expertise and task difficulty (Hypothesis 4).
2. Method
2.1. Participants
Participants in the study were 31 individuals (age: M ¼ 26.45
years, SD¼ 6.31; 8 females and 23males) with three different levels
of expertise. All participants were employed at Air Traffic Control,
The Netherlands. Experts were ten fully licensed air traffic con-
trollers whom had worked for at least two years (years of work
experience: M ¼ 7.10, SD ¼ 6.83; age:M ¼ 33.10 years, SD ¼ 6.81; 2
females and 8 males). Intermediates were nine students in the final
phase of the regular on-the-job-training program for air traffic
controllers (months of training: M ¼ 22.33, SD ¼ 6.20; age:
M¼ 24.67 years, SD¼ 2.18; 3 females and 6males). Novices were 12
students in the initial phase of the ATC training program (months of
training:M ¼ 3.25, SD ¼ 0.45; age:M ¼ 22.25, SD ¼ 2.30; 3 females
and 9 males).
2.2. Materials and apparatus
2.2.1. Air-traffic control tasks
Nine tasks with three difficulty levels (i.e., three easy, three
medium, and three difficult tasks) were composed using still pic-
tures of realistic ATC radar situations. The three levels of difficulty
were determined a priori, depending on the number of aircraft
involved and the number of conflicts ahead. The tasks were
composed by a domain expert in ATC and involved a number of
inbound aircraft heading towards the initial approach fix “Artip” of
Amsterdam Airport Schiphol (see Fig. 1). Artip is the route junction
and initial approach fix that aircraft need to cross (i.e., the ‘goal’).
For each task, participants had to determine the optimal order of
arrival at Artip of the aircraft that had to be controlled (e.g.,
KLM078, KLM1234, TRA321, JAP411 etc.). Three sets of tasks were
composed and each set comprised three of the nine tasks. A set
started with an easy task, followed by a medium task, and finally a
difficult task. To avert any order effects, the order of the sets was
counterbalanced between participants.
ATC is a dynamic task but there are reasons to use still pictures
in this study. Stills of ATC radar situations were used to create
Fig. 1. Negative of example screenshot of an ATC radar screen. The ATC controller has to determine the optimal order of arrival of the aircraft to the initial approach fix Artip.
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ducting analyses on the initial phase of the control process. In ATC,
in the initial phase situational awareness is built to decide on the
optimal order of arrival of the aircraft (Oprins & Schuver, 2003).
Moreover, the analysis of stills allows for the use of fixation pa-
rameters in eye-tracking data, which would not be possible in dy-
namic stimuli due to the occurrence of smooth pursuit. Apart from
time pressure, the use of stills allows to capture all relevant
processes.
2.2.2. Mental effort
For each task the perceived mental effort was measured using
the scale developed by Paas (1992). Participants indicated their
perceived mental effort after accomplishing the task on a 9-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (“very, very low effort”) to 9 (“very,
very high effort”).
2.2.3. Eye-tracking
Because the use of strategies is based on visual information, eye-
tracking is a plausible technique to provide evidence on the stra-
tegies used when carrying out perceptual tasks. Eye-tracking
research distinguishes between fixations and saccades (Holmqvist
et al., 2011). During fixations the eyes stand still and can take in
new information. Saccades are the eye-movements from one fixa-
tion to another. During saccades, the information transfer is sup-
pressed but the focus of attention moves from one element to
another element. Saccades between several areas are also referred
to as transitions.
The still ATC pictures were presented on a 1700 (43 cm) diagonal
screen (1280*1024 pixels). During task performance, eye-movements of participants were recorded with a Tobii 1750
remote eye-tracking system with a temporal resolution of 50 Hz.
Eye-movement datawere recorded and processedwith Tobii Studio
2.1 software using the standard Tobii fixation filter algorithm
(settings: 35 velocity  35 dispersion).
2.3. Procedure
The experiment was run in individual sessions of approximately
60 min. First the participants answered some demographic ques-
tions. Subsequently, participants received the following in-
structions: “You will see nine radar-ATC situations that are
presented one by one. For each situation, please execute the
following task: Determine the preferred order of arrival at point
Artip and report this order out loud. Work as safe, as efficient, and
as fast as possible”. After the warming-up task in which Artip was
indicated, the nine still pictures of ATC radar situations were pre-
sented to the participants one by one. After completing each of the
nine tasks, participants indicated their perceived mental effort.
2.4. Data analysis
An overview of all dependent measures can be found in Table 1.
2.4.1. Analysis of visual strategies
To assign eye-tracking data to an element or region on the
screen, each still ATC picture was divided into areas of interest
(AOI). Visual inspection of the eye-tracking data yielded insight in
the minimal size of the AOIs. Each AOI initially had the same size
and either covered the radar plot, the trail indicated with dots, the
Table 1
Descriptions and explanations of all dependent variables.
Calculation Explanation
Eye-tracking measures
Relative Fixation Duration on Aircraft Dwell on aircraft AOI (% of total time-on-task) Time participants spent looking at
the different aircraft
Relative Fixation Duration on Target Dwell on Artip AOI (% of total time-on-task) Time participants spent looking at the aim
point of the aircraft to arrive at the airport
Relative fixation Duration on Background area Dwell on background (% of total time-on-task) Time participants spent looking at the background
area (i.e., not looking at any AOI but looking
elsewhere on the radar plot)
Time to First Fixations on Aircraft Average time until the participant looked at aircraft
on the screen for the first time from stimulus onset
Time elapsed until participants first looked at any aircraft.
Time to First Fixations on Artip Average time until the participant looked at the
target area on the screen (i.e., Artip) for the first
time from stimulus onset
Time elapsed until participants first looked at the
aim point of the aircraft to arrive at the airport
Number of Fixations on Aircraft Sum of fixations on aircraft AOI Number of looks (i.e., fixations) on any aircraft
Number of Fixations on Artip Sum of fixations on Artip AOI Number of looks (i.e., fixations) at the aim
point of the aircraft
Transitions Artip  Aircraft Number of participants’ fixation switches
from an aircraft AOI to the target AOI and vice versa
Number of switching between looking at one of the
aircraft and looking at the aim point of the airport
Transitions Aircraft (X)  Aircraft (Y) Number of participants’ fixation switches
from an aircraft AOI to another aircraft AOI
Number of switching between looking at one
aircraft and looking at another aircraft
Transitions Artip  Background Number of participants’ fixation switches
from the target AOI to the background AOI and vice versa
Number of switching between looking at one
of the aim point and looking at the background area
Transitions Background  Aircraft Number of participants’ fixation switches
from an aircraft AOI to the background AOI and vice versa
Number of switching between looking at the
background area and looking at one of the aircrafts
Similarity measure
Similarity of Task Solutions Levenshtein distance between two task solutions Participants are asked to provide an order in
which the aircraft arrive in the landing point,
resulting in a string of aircraft names. We
compared each participant’s order to the rest of his
or her group. This was done by transforming one
aircraft string to the other (either by insertion,
deletion, or substitution), calculating the number
of transitions made, and transforming this into a
percentage value.
Performance measures
Task Correctness Score Maximum score (i.e., 5 points) minus
one point per unrealistic order
Participants’ score on their proposed order of
arrival of aircraft
Time-on-task Time between stimulus onset until a solution is given Participants’ time to decide the order of
arrival of all aircraft
Perceived Mental Effort Participants’ perceived mental effort per task Subjectively rated amount of cognitive
capacity used for a task
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close to each other, the related AOIs overlapped. In such cases, the
overlapping AOIs were equally reduced in size until they were
exactly adjacent to each other (for an example, see Fig. 2).
The following eye-tracking measures were derived per AOI:
Relative fixation duration (i.e., total time spent looking at a certain
area on the screen), time until first fixation (i.e., the time until the
participant looked at a certain area on the screen for the first time
from stimulus onset), the number of fixations (i.e., number of looks
at a certain area on the screen), and AOI transition matrices (i.e.,
indicators for how often participants switched their gaze from one
AOI to another AOI). Because time-on-task differed across partici-
pants, also the total fixation duration did. Hence, to make this fix-
ation duration comparable across participants and across tasks, the
sum of total fixation durations on AOIs and non-AOI areas was
standardized by dividing each sum by the individual time spent on
task. This resulted in relative fixation duration measures which
indicated the ratio of participants’ attention. Missing values (i.e., no
visit on AOI) were replaced by zero. In case of no visit on AOI, no
time to first fixation was recorded either. Hence, to make this eye-
tracking parameter comparable across participants, missing values
were replaced by the maximum time-on-task across participants
(see for a description of the same procedure, Jarodzka et al., 2010).
To obtain transition matrices, individual strings of all fixation lo-
cations were exported from Tobii Studio and transformed per ATC
task into matrices. These matrices comprised per task the numberof transitions for each participant between and within all different
AOIs. Per task and per participant the total number of transitions
between different aircraft and the total number of transitions
within aircraft were computed. Per task only one AOI covered Artip
and the background area was defined as the area not being covered
by an AOI (i.e., non-AOI area). Finally, the total number of transi-
tions between aircraft and background, aircraft and Artip, and
background and Artip were computed.
2.4.2. Analysis of similarity of task solutions
Two experts blindly and independently scored all performances
on one of the difficult tasks (i.e., more than 10% of the tasks). They
subtracted one point from the maximum of five points for each
unrealistic order of aircraft resulting in a task correctness score. The
maximum number of points subtracted was five so that the scores
ranged between 0 and 5. They achieved a high inter-rater reli-
ability: Spearman rank correlation r ¼ .846 (p < .001). The
remaining tasks were scored by only one of the experts.
The similarity of task solutions was calculated by means of
sequence analyses based on the so-called Levenshtein distances
(Levenshtein, 1966). The Levenshtein distance is a measure for
difference between two sequences. It is obtained by the minimal
number of operations needed to transfer one sequence into another
sequence. The possible operations are insertions, deletions, or
substitutions of single characters. To determine the Levenshtein
distance in the present study, a string of aircraft that a participant
Fig. 2. Examples of Areas of Interest (AOIs) around aircraft and Artip. Size of the AOIs is determined by the average size and shape of an eye-tracking heat map. The AOIs around the
aircraft were adjusted in size to not overlap each other.
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JAP411,.) served as the input data. The number of operations (i.e.,
insertions or deletions of aircraft) needed to transform the aircraft
sequence of this participant into that of another participant de-
scribes the difference between the two sequences of aircraft. The
Levenshtein distance was determined for the aircraft sequences of
experts, intermediates and novices to analyze the similarity of task
solutions used within these groups. This procedure resulted in a
similarity score for each possible pair of experts, intermediates, and
novices.
For all analyses a factorial repeated-measures ANOVA is used
with levels of expertise (i.e., novice, intermediate, expert) as
between-subjects factor and difficulty (i.e., easy, medium, and
difficult) as within-subjects factor. A significance level of .05 is used
for all reported analyses. To test the hypotheses, the main effects of
expertise level and task difficulty and their interaction are reported.
In case of a significant effect, Bonferroni post-hoc tests are con-
ducted. Because of problems with sphericity, the results of the
Greenhouse Geisser contrast analysis are given.
3. Results
3.1. Visual problem solving strategies
Means and standard deviations of all eye-tracking measures are
presented in Table 2.
3.1.1. Fixation duration
To test Hypotheses 1a (i.e., information reduction strategy) and
1b (i.e., perceptual chunking strategy), the relative fixation duration
on aircraft, relative fixation duration on Artip, and relative fixationduration on the background area were analyzed. Relative fixation
durations are given as percentage of time-on-task.
Results showed no main effect of expertise level on relative
fixation duration on aircraft, F(2, 29) ¼ 1.240, MSE ¼ 16.146,
p ¼ .305, hp2 ¼ :081, but it showed a main effect of task difficulty,
F(2, 58) ¼ 32.02, MSE ¼ 36.73, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :534. Post-hoc tests
revealed that relative fixation duration on aircraft in easy tasks was
significantly shorter than in medium tasks (p ¼ .015), and that
relative fixation duration on aircraft in both easy tasks andmedium
tasks was shorter than in difficult tasks (both p-values < .001). No
interaction effect was found between expertise level and task dif-
ficulty on relative fixation duration on aircraft, F(4, 58) ¼ 2.45,
MSE ¼ 36.37, p ¼ .060, hp2 ¼ :149.
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on relative fix-
ation duration on Artip, F(2, 29) ¼ 8.96, MSE ¼ .19, p ¼ .001,
hp
2 ¼ :39, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 58) ¼ 6.88,
MSE ¼ .617, p ¼ .008, hp2 ¼ :197. Post-hoc tests in expertise levels
revealed that novices fixated longer on Artip than both in-
termediates (p¼ .009) and experts (p¼ .002). Post-hoc tests in task
difficulty revealed that relative fixation duration on Artip in easy
tasks was longer than in difficult tasks (p ¼ .024). Moreover, results
showed an interaction effect between expertise level and task
difficulty, F(4, 58) ¼ 4.174, MSE ¼ .617, p ¼ .015, hp2 ¼ :230 (see
Fig. 3a). Post-hoc tests revealed that on easy tasks novices fixated
longer on Artip than both experts (p ¼ .001) and intermediates
(p ¼ .002); on medium tasks, novices fixated longer on Artip than
experts (p ¼ .015), and on difficult tasks novices fixated longer on
Artip than both experts (p ¼ .010) and intermediates (p ¼ .010).
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on relative fix-
ation duration on the background area, F(2, 29)¼ 4.03,MSE¼ 19.94,
p ¼ .029, hp2 ¼ :224, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
Table 2
Means and standard deviations of all dependent variables.
Experts Intermediates Novices












Relative Fixation Duration Aircraft
(% Total time-on-task)
88.86 (4.18) 89.81 (5.31) 94.27 (3.50) 86.01 (6.73) 86.77 (8.89) 91.87 (4.28) 85.17 (4.13) 91.40 (3.21) 94.65 (2.00)
Relative Fixation Duration on Artip
(% Total time-on-task)
0.06 (0.14) 0.01 (0.04) 0.06 (0.15) 0.23 (0.49) 0.16 (0.27) 0.04 (0.08) 1.25 (1.09) 0.64 (0.71) 0.43 (0.45)
Relative fixation Duration on
Background area
(% Total time-on-task)
3.27 (3.17) 5.33 (5.94) 2.49 (2.06) 10.40 (7.36) 11.96 (10.26) 6.19 (4.30) 10.20 (3.89) 5.61 (3.05) 2.75 (1.23)
Time to First Fixations on
Aircraft (Sum of Time
to First Fixations on
Planes in seconds)
22.65 (6.01) 21.30 (7.23) 80.82 (22.57) 24.02 (6.58) 32.22 (6.55) 107.56 (21.43) 30.02 (8.97) 34.65 (9.51) 130.50 (39.24)
Time to First Fixations on
Artip (in seconds)
30.07 (3.01) 40.90 (4.00) 44.18 (6.18) 28.70 (6.16) 34.39 (12.56) 46.78 (.26) 18.28 (10.24) 29.16 (13.68) 28.68 (19.83)
Number of Fixations on Aircraft 13.87 (4.91) 27.83 (10.26) 62.13 (16.65) 18.96 (5.26) 35.00 (8.39) 78.11 (18.37) 22.94 (6.57) 42.25 (14.06) 77.31 (21.50)
Number of Fixations on Artip 0.07 (0.14) 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.14) 0.11 (0.24) 0.19 (0.29) 0.07 (0.15) 0.72 (0.57) 0.58 (0.61) 0.64 (0.67)
Transitions Artip  Planes 0.10 (0.16) 0.03 (0.11) 0.07 (0.21) 0.260 (0.32) 0.11 (0.17) 0.70 (1.42) 0.81 (0.70) 0.72 (0.68) 1.36 (1.66)
Transitions Aircraft (X)  Aircraft (Y) 8.83 (3.32) 17.90 (7.99) 46.13 (14.70) 11.00 (3.17) 20.93 (6.34) 53.96 (13.46) 13.28 (3.83) 27.140 (9.70) 55.50 (18.33)
Transitions Artip  Background 0.03 (0.11) 0.00 (0.00) 0.13 (0.28) 0.07 (0.22) 0.11 (0.24) 0.07 (0.15) 0.47 (0.50) 0.33 (0.47) 0.22 (0.26)
Transitions Background  Aircraft 1.37 (0.90) 3.30 (2.43) 4.27 (3.16) 4.70 (2.93) 9.93 (6.99) 9.52 (5.12) 6.67 (3.44) 7.31 (3.99) 6.32 (3.79)
Similarity
Similarity of Task Solutions .96 (.09) .59 (.17) .23 (.07) .91 (.11) .47 (.19) .21 (.05) .71 (.19) .40 (.16) .18 (.04)
Performance
Task Correctness Score 4.97 (0.11) 4.83 (0.28) 4.08 (0.79) 4.78 (0.55) 4.48 (0.63) 3.65 (0.79) 4.53 (0.61) 3.97 (0.56) 2.97 (0.942)
Time-on-task 9.51 (2.36) 16.28 (2.98) 31.19 (5.65) 12.26 (2.78) 21.85 (4.06) 40.28 (6.70) 16.23 (4.45) 25.79 (6.55) 44.76 (8.71)
Perceived Mental Effort 2.00 (0.70) 3.80 (1.06) 5.30 (1.44) 3.41 (1.01) 4.78 (0.76) 6.07 (0.85) 3.19 (0.89) 4.39 (0.57) 5.56 (0.50)
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between expertise levels revealed that intermediates fixated longer
on the background area than experts (p ¼ .025), while novices did
not differ from intermediates (p ¼ .307) and experts (p ¼ .609).
Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels revealed that relative
fixation duration on the background area in easy tasks was signif-
icantly longer than in both medium and difficult tasks (both p-
values < .001). Moreover, results showed an interaction effect be-
tween expertise level and task difficulty, F(4, 58) ¼ 5.835,
MSE ¼ 28.791, p ¼ .001, hp2 ¼ :294 (see Fig. 3b). Post-hoc tests
revealed that on easy tasks experts fixated less on the background
area than both intermediates (p ¼ .012) and novices (p ¼ .009). On
difficult tasks, intermediates fixated more on the background area
than both experts (p ¼ .017) and novices (p ¼ .022).
3.1.2. Time to first fixation
To further test Hypothesis 1a (i.e., information reduction strat-
egy), the time to first fixation on aircraft and time to first fixation on
Artip were analyzed.Fig. 3. a. Means and standard deviations of fixation duration on Artip by experts, intermedia
fixation duration on the background area by experts, intermediates and novices in easy, mResults showed a main effect of expertise level on time to first
fixation on aircraft, F(2, 29) ¼ 8.21, MSE ¼ 158.44, p ¼ .002,
hp
2 ¼ :37, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 327.32, MSE ¼ 1402.47, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :921. Post-hoc tests
between expertise levels revealed that novices took significantly
more time than experts to first fixate on aircraft (p ¼ .001), while
intermediates did not differ from novices (p ¼ .334) and experts
(p ¼ .109). Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels revealed
that time to first fixation on aircraft in difficult tasks was longer
than in both medium tasks and easy tasks, and longer in medium
tasks than in easy tasks (all p-values < .001). Moreover, results
showed an interaction effect between expertise level and task
difficulty, F(4, 58)¼ 6.813,MSE¼ 1402.47, p¼ .003, hp2 ¼ :327 (see
Fig. 4). Post-hoc tests revealed that in medium tasks, experts
showed a shorter time to first fixation on aircraft than both in-
termediates (p ¼ .019) and novices (p ¼ .002), and in difficult tasks,
experts showed a shorter time than novices (p ¼ .002).
Results also showed a main effect of expertise level on time to
first fixation on Artip, F(2, 29) ¼ 8.00, MSE ¼ 69.02, p ¼ .002,tes and novices in easy, medium and difficult tasks. b. Means and standard deviations of
edium and difficult tasks.
Fig. 5. Means and standard deviations of transitions between the background area and
aircraft by experts, intermediates and novices in easy, medium and difficult tasks.
Fig. 4. Means and standard deviations of time to first fixation on aircraft by experts,
intermediates and novices in easy, medium, and difficult tasks.
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2 ¼ :364, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 22.852, MSE ¼ 248.82, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :449. Post-hoc tests
between expertise levels revealed that novices took less time to
first fixate on Artip than both intermediates (p ¼ .014) and experts
(p¼ .003), while intermediates and experts did not differ from each
other (p ¼ 1.00). Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels
revealed that time to first fixation on Artip in easy tasks is shorter
than in medium tasks and difficult tasks (both p-values < .001). No
interaction effect was found between expertise level and task dif-
ficulty, F(4, 58) ¼ 1.623, MSE ¼ 46.75, p ¼ .192, hp2 ¼ :104.
3.1.3. Number of fixations
To test Hypothesis 1c (i.e., means-end analysis) and to further
test Hypothesis 1a, the number of fixations on aircraft and then
number of fixations on Artip were analyzed.
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on number of
fixations on aircraft, F(2, 29) ¼ 3.58, MSE ¼ 131.57, p ¼ .041,
hp
2 ¼ :204, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 341.59, MSE ¼ 232.00, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :924. Post-hoc tests
between expertise levels revealed that novices used more fixations
on aircraft than experts (p ¼ .042). Post-hoc tests between task
difficulty levels revealed that number of fixations on aircraft in easy
tasks is lower than in bothmedium tasks and difficult tasks (both p-
values < .001) and in medium tasks the number of fixations on
aircraft is lower than in difficult tasks (p < .001). No interaction
effect was found between expertise level and task difficulty, F(4,
58) ¼ 1.440, MSE ¼ 232.00, p ¼ .250, hp2 ¼ :093.
Results also showed a main effect of expertise level on number
of fixations on Artip, F(2, 29) ¼ 8.29, MSE ¼ .141, p ¼ .001,
hp
2 ¼ :372. No main effect of task difficulty was found, F(2,
58)¼ .314,MSE¼ .143, p< .716, hp2 ¼ :011. Post-hoc tests between
expertise levels revealed that novices used more fixations on Artip
than both intermediates (p ¼ .011) and experts (p ¼ .003). No
interaction effect was found between expertise level and task dif-
ficulty, F(4, 58) ¼ .812, MSE ¼ .143, p ¼ .516, hp2 ¼ :055.
3.1.4. Transitions
To further test Hypothesis 1b (i.e., perceptual chunking strategy)
and Hypothesis 1c, the number of transitions between Artip and
aircraft, different aircraft (e.g., Aircraft X  Aircraft Y), Artip and
background (e.g., Artip  some white space around Artip or around
the aircraft), and background and aircraft were analyzed.
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on number of
transitions between Artip and aircraft, F(2, 29) ¼ 6.78, MSE ¼ .34,p ¼ .004, hp2 ¼ :33, but no main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 3.396, MSE ¼ 2.085, p ¼ .065, hp2 ¼ :108. Post-hoc tests be-
tween expertise levels revealed that experts used less transitions
betweenArtip andaircraft thannovices (p¼ .004),while experts and
intermediates (p ¼ .861) as well as novices and intermediates
(p¼ .079) did not differ significantly fromeach other. No interaction
effect was found, F(4, 58) ¼ 1.768,MSE ¼ .174, p ¼ .149, hp2 ¼ :112.
Results showed no main effect of expertise level on number of
transitions between different aircraft, F(2, 29) ¼ 2.06, MSE ¼ 78.07,
p ¼ .146, hp2 ¼ :13, but showed a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 272.73, MSE ¼ 254.81, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :907. Post-hoc tests
between task difficulty levels revealed that the number of transi-
tions between different aircraft in easy tasks was less than in both
medium and difficult tasks, and also less in medium tasks than in
difficult tasks (all p-values < .001). No interaction effect was found,
F(4, 58) ¼ .794, MSE ¼ 254.81, p ¼ .479, hp2 ¼ :054.
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on number of
transitions between Artip and background, F(2, 29) ¼ 5.08,
MSE¼ .054, p¼ .013, hp2 ¼ :27, but nomain effect of task difficulty,
F(2, 58) ¼ .403, MSE ¼ .174, p ¼ .668, hp2 ¼ :014. Post-hoc tests
between expertise levels revealed that experts showed fewer
transitions between Artip and background than novices (p ¼ .023).
Intermediates and novices (p ¼ .056) and experts and in-
termediates (p ¼ 1.00) did not differ significantly. No interaction
effect was found, F(4, 58) ¼ 1.77, MSE ¼ .174, p ¼ .149, hp2 ¼ :112.
Finally, results showed a main effect of expertise level on
number of transitions between background and aircraft, F(2,
29)¼ 6.71,MSE¼ 10.13, p¼ .004, hp2 ¼ :32, as well as a main effect
of task difficulty, F(2, 58) ¼ 8.430, MSE ¼ 25.546, p ¼ .001,
hp
2 ¼ :231. Post-hoc tests between expertise levels revealed that
experts used fewer transitions between background and aircraft
than both intermediates (p ¼ .005) and novices (p ¼ .029), while
intermediates and novices did not differ significantly from each
other (p ¼ 1.00). Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels
revealed that the number of transitions between background and
aircraft in easy tasks was smaller than in both medium tasks and
difficult tasks (both p-values ¼ .002). Moreover, an interaction ef-
fect was found between expertise level and task difficulty, F(4,
58) ¼ 29.98, MSE ¼ 25.545, p ¼ .031, hp2 ¼ :176 (see Fig. 5). Post-
hoc tests revealed that on easy tasks experts showed less transi-
tions between background and aircraft than both intermediates
(p ¼ .037) and novices (p < .001). Experts also showed less tran-
sitions than intermediates in medium tasks (p ¼ .014) and difficult
tasks (p ¼ .026).
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To test Hypothesis 2 (i.e., similarity) the similarity of task solu-
tions was analyzed. Results showed a main effect of expertise level
on similarity, F(2, 156)¼ 62.24,MSE¼ .006, p< .001, hp2 ¼ :444, as
well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2, 312) ¼ 870.35,
MSE ¼ .059, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :848. Post-hoc tests between expertise
levels revealed that experts were more similar to each other in
performing the tasks than intermediates (p ¼ .003), and both ex-
perts and intermediates were more similar to each other than
novices (both p-values < .001). Post-hoc tests between task diffi-
culty levels revealed that similarity of task solutions in easy tasks
was higher than inmedium and difficult tasks, and inmedium tasks
more similar than in difficult tasks (all p-values < .001). Moreover,
results showed an interaction effect between expertise level and
task difficulty, F(4, 312) ¼ 10.63, MSE ¼ . 059, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :120
(see Fig. 6). Post-hoc tests revealed that on easy tasks novices were
less similar than both intermediates and experts (both p-
values < .001). On medium tasks experts were more similar than
both intermediates (p ¼ .008) and novices (p < .001). On difficult
tasks novices were less similar than both intermediates (p < .001)
and experts (p ¼ .003).
3.3. Performance
To test Hypothesis 3 (i.e., performance), task correctness score,
time-on-task and perceived mental effort were analyzed. Results
showed a main effect of expertise level on task correctness score,
F(2, 29) ¼ 13.56, MSE ¼ 0.13, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :49, as well as a main
effect of task difficulty, F(2, 58) ¼ 27.85, MSE ¼ 1.298, p < .001,
hp
2 ¼ :499. Post-hoc tests between expertise levels revealed that
novices scored significantly lower than both experts (p < .001) and
intermediates (p ¼ .018), while experts and intermediates did not
differ significantly from each other (p ¼ .187). Post-hoc tests be-
tween task difficulty levels revealed that task correctness scores in
difficult tasks were lower than in medium tasks and easy tasks
(both p-values < .001). No interaction effect between expertise
level and task difficulty was found, F(4, 58) ¼ 0.788, MSE ¼ 1.298,
p ¼ .533, hp2 ¼ :053.
Results showed a main effect of expertise level on time-on-task,
F(2, 29)¼ 11.67,MSE¼ 23,12, p< .001, hp2 ¼ :455, as well as amain
effect of task difficulty, F(2, 58) ¼ 3.838, MSE ¼ 34.029, p ¼ .012,
hp
2 ¼ :215. Post-hoc tests between expertise levels revealed that
experts performed the tasks significantly faster than both novices
(p < .001) and intermediates (p ¼ .042), while novices and in-
termediates did not differ significantly from each other (p ¼ .184).
Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels revealed that time on
task on easy tasks was shorter than on both medium and difficult
tasks, and also shorter on medium tasks than on difficult tasks (allFig. 6. Means and standard deviations of similarities between the chosen task solu-
tions by experts, intermediates and novices in easy, medium and difficult tasks.p-values < .001). Moreover, results showed an interaction effect
between expertise and difficulty level, F(4, 58)¼ 3.84,MSE¼ 34.03,
p ¼ .012, hp2 ¼ :215 (see Fig. 7). On easy tasks novices took longer
than both experts (p < .001) and intermediates (p ¼ .042). On
medium tasks experts were faster than novices (p < .001). On
difficult tasks experts were faster than both novices (p ¼ .033) and
intermediates (p < .001).
Finally, results showed a main effect of expertise level on
perceived mental effort, F(2, 29) ¼ 5.16, MSE ¼ .53, p ¼ .012,
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2 ¼ :27, as well as a main effect of task difficulty, F(2,
58) ¼ 150.914, MSE ¼ 1.922, p < .001, hp2 ¼ :844. Post-hoc tests
between expertise levels revealed that experts perceived less
mental effort in performing the tasks than intermediates (p¼ .011),
while, unexpectedly, experts and novices (p ¼ .115) as well as in-
termediates and novices (p ¼ .767) did not differ significantly from
each other. Post-hoc tests between task difficulty levels revealed
that perceived mental effort in easy tasks was lower than in me-
dium and difficult tasks, and in medium tasks was lower than in
difficult tasks (all p-values < .001). No interaction effect between
expertise level and task difficulty was found, F(4,58) ¼ 1.616,
MSE ¼ 3.107, p ¼ .210, hp2 ¼ :104.
4. Discussion
The main aim of this study was to investigate expertise differ-
ences in visual problem solving strategies and the similarity of task
solutions reached at different levels of expertise. Novices, in-
termediates and experts worked on nine ATC tasks at three levels of
difficulty. First, we expected to find differences in eye-movements
related to three visual problem solving strategies: Information
reduction, perceptual chunking, and means-end analysis. Second,
we expected to find differences between expertise levels in the
similarity of reached task solutions. Third, we ascertained that
performance (i.e., correctness, speed, and perceived mental effort)
was indeed different between the three expertise levels. Fourth, we
investigated whether task difficulty moderated the effects of
expertise.4.1. Visual processes
Our results clearly support the assumption that experts, in-
termediates and novices apply different visual problem solving
strategies (Hypothesis 1). First, there was more information
reduction for higher levels of expertise (Hypothesis 1a). NovicesFig. 7. Means and standard deviations of total time-on-task by experts, intermediates
and novices in easy, medium and difficult tasks.
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termediates and experts; for intermediates and experts, Artip
seems to be an irrelevant area because they simply “know where
the goal is”. Furthermore, novices took more time before they first
fixated on aircraft. This indicates that they have trouble finding the
relevant areas and fixate on irrelevant areas before finding the
relevant ones.
Second, experts showed more perceptual chunking of related
elements than intermediates and novices (Hypothesis 1b). For ex-
perts, fewer fixations on aircraft and fewer transitions between
aircraft and the background area were found than for both in-
termediates and novices. In addition, experts spent less time
looking at the background area than intermediates. Thus, experts
seem to recognize familiar patterns of task elements (i.e., grouped
aircraft) and need to orientate themselves less on the space sur-
rounding these elements to effectively deal with them. These
findings clearly demonstrate superior perceptual chunking strate-
gies for experts.
Third, experts seem to use a working-forward rather than
means-end strategy (Hypothesis 1c). They showed fewer transi-
tions that included the destination point of the aircraft (i.e., Artip-
aircraft and Artip-background) than novices. This indicates that
novices frequently focus on the ‘goal’ in order to reach a solution,
while experts develop a solution without paying attention to the
goal. For intermediates, the number of transitions including Artip is
in between that of experts and novices. This suggests a more or less
linear development from a means-end strategy to a working-
forward strategy.
4.2. Performance
With regard to the similarity of solutions, our results show that
solutions of experts are more similar to each other than solutions
of intermediates, and that solutions of intermediates are more
similar to each other than solutions of novices (Hypothesis 2).
Thus, experts recognize a broad range of problem situations which
allows them to come up with optimal solutions that are relatively
similar across different experts; they all work towards a compa-
rable pre-sorted order of arrival. Intermediates recognize less
problem situations and/or have more difficulties to link these sit-
uations to their decisions, and novices apply weak problem solving
methods such as means-end analysis, both leading to less simi-
larity of their solutions (cf. Medin et al., 2006). This is an important
finding because it suggests that it is worthwhile to teach expert
strategies, not only because they are more effective in reaching
high performance but also because they are univocal compared to
non-expert strategies. Our findings add to earlier findings by
Jarodzka et al. (2010) and Medin, Lynch, Coley, and Atran (1997),
showing that higher expertise is related to higher similarity in
reached solutions.
Experts and intermediates showed better and faster perfor-
mance than novices (Hypothesis 3). However, the differences be-
tween experts and intermediates were not significantly different
although in the expected direction. Possibly, the whole set of tasks
was not complex enough to reveal performance differences be-
tween intermediates, who were nearly certified air traffic control-
lers, and experts. For perceivedmental effort, an unexpectedfinding
is that the effort reported by intermediates is not only higher than
that of experts but also than that of novices. On the one hand, this
fits the assumption that intermediates may have the knowledge
needed to carry out the given tasks but, compared to experts, lag
behind in their strategies of efficient information retrieval from the
scene (i.e., perceptual chunking). On the other hand, it indicates that
novices not only used less effective but also less effort-demanding
strategies than intermediates. As a speculation, they experiencedthe tasks as so difficult that they were not inclined to invest a high
level of mental effort.
Finally, the findings concerning the moderating effects of task
difficulty (Hypothesis 4) are equivocal. As expected, the differences
between expertise levels are for some of the measures more pro-
nounced for difficult tasks than for easy tasks. For time to first
fixation on aircraft, the differences between expertise levels are
larger for difficult tasks than for easy tasks; for difficult tasks,
expert are quicker than intermediates and intermediates are
quicker than novices. For similarity of solutions, similarity de-
creases somewhat for experts and intermediates as tasks become
more complex, but it is consistently low for novices. And for time on
task, the difference between novices and experts is smaller for easy
tasks than for more difficult tasks. Taken together, these findings
suggest that the superior visual problem solving strategies of ex-
perts and, to a lesser degree, intermediates yield a greater advan-
tage when working on more difficult tasks.
Yet, some interactions yielded unexpected patterns. Compared
to intermediates and experts, novices fixated less on Artip and less
on the background area as tasks became more difficult. This in-
dicates that for difficult tasks, novices lose the destination out of
sight and seem to become less aware of the whole situation. In
other words, the difficult tasks seem to be ‘too difficult’ for the
novices, which is also evidenced by their low performance and, as
speculated above, their low readiness to invest effort in performing
the task. In addition, it is in line with the findings for transitions
between background area and aircraft. Experts show more transi-
tions, and thus more awareness of the problem situation as tasks
become more difficult; intermediates only show this increase from
easy to difficult tasks, and novices do not show such an increase at
all.
To summarize, the use of eye-tracking made it possible to un-
ravel the visual problem solving strategies that experts, in-
termediates and novices use when solving perceptual problems in
the complex domain of air traffic control. First, the development of
information reduction abilities as described by Haider and Frensch
(1999) was demonstrated by faster and longer fixations on relevant
areas as expertise increases. Second, the development of schemas
that chunk elements together (Gobet & Simon, 1998) was
confirmed by more efficient scan paths as expertise increases. The
higher investment of mental effort by intermediates reflects the
difficulties they encounter with linking the applicable cognitive
schemas to the situation at hand (Boshuizen & Schmidt, 2008).
Third, the change from a means-end approach to a working-
forward approach (Simon, 1975) became evident by focusing less
on the final destination point (Artip) as expertise increases.
Furthermore, reached solutions became more similar with higher
expertise and the more effective strategies of experts often had
greater value for more difficult tasks.
4.3. Directions for future research
Our findings indicate two issues that need to be further inves-
tigated. First, limited differences in performance were found be-
tween intermediates and experts. Future research should contain
more complex tasks to create situations in which experts perform
significantly higher than intermediates. Such more complex tasks
may also be more suitable to unravel their full scale of expertise.
Higher levels of complexity could, for example, be obtained by
using dynamic traffic situations rather than the stills as used in this
study and including modality in the stimuli by presenting more
irrelevant information on the screens and/or using audio. Second,
future research should aim to explain our unexpected findings for
novices, in particular, their low investment of mental effort. It
should test our speculation that tasks were experienced as too
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ingness” to invest high effort in solving the visual problems. As self-
efficacy is known as a good predictor of performance (Pintrich & De
Groot, 1990), self-efficacy measures could be used to provide
insight in participants’ belief that one is capable of carrying out a
task (Lodewyk & Winne, 2005; Schunk, 1985). Moreover, with
better eye-tracking technologies, it will become possible to mea-
sure mental effort more directly by the use of eye-tracking (e.g.,
Klingner, Tversky, & Hanrahan, 2011; May, Kennedy, Williams,
Dunlap, & Brannan, 1990).
With regard to theoretical implications, the cognitive theories
used to predict our findings turned out to be directly applicable for
some visual problem solving processes (e.g., time to first fixation).
But for other visual processes (e.g., number of transitions, fixation
duration on AOIs) these theories seem to be too limited. More
insight in the origin of visual problem solving processes is required
and to explain all of our findings, cognitive theories should not only
be integrated with visual cognitive (i.e., perceptual) theories but
also integrate their description and explanation of the development
of attentional processes, chunking processes and problem-solving
processes with increasing expertise. With regard to the integra-
tion of perceptual aspects, stronger theories should, for example,
include the visual integration of information elements in order to
explain findings on transitions. With regard to the integration of
attentional, chunking and problem-solving processes, such theories
should also be able to distinguish more clearly between the
working-forward strategies of experts and the strategies of in-
termediates, which seem to be somewhere between working for-
ward and means-end analysis, in relation to the investment of
mental effort and especially the high effort reported by in-
termediates. As another example, such theories should provide an
explanation for experts’ ability to oversee all small but relevant
details in visual stimuli and how their strategy to chunk and reduce
incoming information elements enables this.
4.4. Practical implications
With regard to practical implications, our findings inform the
design of eye-movement modeling examples (EMMEs) that could
be used to train visual problem solving strategies for novices, in-
termediates and experts. Novices use means-end analysis, do not
yet have the ability to ignore irrelevant information, and possess
no chunks to treat related information elements as one element
when solving visual problems. Hence, EMMEs for novices should
first show which information is needed to work forward to the
goal instead of backward from the goal. That way, the learner is
shown how decisions are made without taking the general desti-
nation point into account. Second, they must indicate which in-
formation is relevant for problem solving, and where this
information is located in the complex visual representation. Third,
they should make visible which related information elements can
be treated as chunks. And finally, they should reflect the diver-
gence in visual problem solving strategies applied by experts (Van
Merriënboer & Kirschner, 2013) because the similarity of expert
strategies is yet relatively high but might still lead to slightly
different solutions.
For intermediates, EMMEs should primarily take into account
their tendency to focus on irrelevant information resulting in a
relatively high cognitive load. They should help them to reduce
visual search by focusing on the information that is minimally
required to take safe decisions. For example, EMMEs could be based
on prototypical situations for which it is known that visual problem
solving profits from the use of a perceptual chunking strategy (e.g.,
Gobet & Simon, 1998). Then, intermediates could learn how to
recognize the most relevant information from a related group ofobjects and, next, why the grouped elements are crucial to rely on
in a certain situation (i.e., perceptual chunking).
For experts, EMMEs could be used to train them inworking with
newly introduced technologies or regulations, which might require
the observation of new information elements during visual prob-
lem solving (e.g., additional information in aircraft labels from new
spacing tools). In such situations, EMMEs could be helpful in the
sameway as they are for intermediates. Furthermore, EMMEs based
on the eye-movements of peers or on own eye-movements could
help to foster reflection on the use of own visual problem solving
strategies and so contribute to a process of deliberate practice
(Ericsson, 2004).
A limitation of our study is that solely eye-tracking measures
were used to reveal visual problem solving strategies. A triangula-
tion of data includinge in addition to eye-trackingmeasurese self-
reports (e.g., cued retrospective reports) and/or questionnaires
could further disclose the use of visual problem solving strategies
and unravel their relation to, for example, knowledge structures
and motivation. Furthermore, the number of participants in our
study was relatively low because there are not many experts in ATC
available, participation of these experts is expensive, and eye-
tracking data require much time and effort to analyze. Although
the number of participants per condition in our study is comparable
to that of similar expertise research (cf. Gegenfurtner et al., 2011),
results could have been more pronounced with more participants.
Concluding, this study gave insight in three developmental
phases of visual problem solving strategies across a range of task
difficulties. It showed that strategies are clearly different for
different levels of expertise and lead to more similar solutions as
expertise increases. The findings provide important implications for
the design of EMMEs for training in complex visual domains. Our
study showed that care must be taken in selecting eye-movement
models in order to fit the development level of learners’ cognitive
schemas and their related visual problem solving strategies.
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